Abstract-Fault
I. INTRODUCTION (HEADING 1)
FAULT ATTACK on the hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms was firstly studied by Boneh et al. and since then, it has been successfully applied to a variety of ciphers To resist fault attacks, several methods and architectures have been proposed. However, because most of the current integrated circuits are synchronous, and their activities are controlled by a global clock, the behavior and sensitivity of synchronous circuits may make the ciphers exposed to fault attacks.
Clockless circuits represent a class of circuits which are not controlled by a global clock or data, but by those logical relationships. Because of their specific architecture, clockless circuits have more different behaviors than synchronous circuits in the presence of faults. NCL is a type of asynchronous logic, and it is a delay-insensitive (DI) logic. The logically determined property of NCL circuits makes them naturally against some categories of faults and fault sensitivity analysis. Thus, NCL circuits are an attractive design option for fault-tolerant systems.
II. NCL BASICS

A. Asynchronous logic
For the last three decades, the focus of digital design has been primarily on synchronous, clocked architectures. However, as clock rates have significantly increased while feature size has decreased, clock skew has become a major problem. High performance chips must dedicate increasingly larger portions of their area for clock drivers to achieve acceptable skew, causing these chips to dissipate increasingly higher power, especially at the clock edge, when switching is most prevalent. As these trends continue, the clock is becoming more and more difficult to manage, while clocked circuits' inherent power inefficiencies are emerging as the dominant factor hindering increased performance. These issues have caused renewed interest in asynchronous digital design. Asynchronous, clockless circuits require less power, generate less noise, and produce less electro-magnetic interference (EMI), compared to their synchronous counterparts, without degrading performance. Furthermore, delayinsensitive (DI) asynchronous paradigms have a number of additional advantages, especially when designing complex circuits, like Systems-on-a-Chip (SoCs), including substantially reduced crosstalk between analog and digital circuits, ease of integrating multi-rate circuits, and facilitation of component reuse. Asynchronous circuits can even utilize a synchronous wrapper, such that the end user does not know that the internal circuitry is actually asynchronous in nature. Currently, companies such as ARM, Phillips, Intel, and others are incorporating asynchronous logic into some of their products using their own proprietary tools 
B.
Null Convention Logic NCL is a delay-insensitive (DI) asynchronous (i.e., clockless) paradigm, which means that NCL circuits will operate correctly regardless of when circuit inputs become available; therefore, NCL circuits are said to be correct-by-construction (i.e., no timing analysis is necessary for correct operation). NCL circuits utilize dual-rail or quad-rail logic to achieve delay-insensitivity. A dual-rail signal, D, consists of two wires or rails, D0 and D1, which may assume any value from the set {DATA0, DATA1, NULL}, as depicted in Table 1 .1.. THmn gates have n inputs. At least m of the n inputs must be asserted before the output will become asserted. In a THmn gate, each of the n inputs is connected to the rounded portion of the gate; the output emanates from the pointed end of the gate; and the gate's threshold value, m, is written inside of the gate
D. State-holding capability
In the NCL pipeline, threshold gates are designed with hysteresis state-holding capability, such that after the output is asserted, all inputs must be deasserted before the output is deasserted.Hysteresis ensures a complete transition of inputs back to NULL before asserting the output associated with the next wavefront of the input data.,
E. Delay-Insensitive Register
NCL systems contain at least two DI registers, one at both the input and at the output. Two adjacent register stages interact through their request and acknowledge signals, Ki and Ko, respectively, to prevent the current DATA wavefront from overwriting the previous DATA wavefront, by ensuring that the two DATA wavefronts are always separated by a NULL wavefront. The acknowledge signals are combined in the Completion Detection circuitry to produce the request signal(s) to the previous register stage. NCL registration is realized through cascaded arrangements of single-bit dual-rail registers or single-signal quad-rail registers, The registers shown below are reset to NULL, since all TH22 gates are reset to logic 0. However, either register could be instead reset to a DATA value by replacing exactly one of the TH22n gates with a TH22d gate 
III. FAULTS PROPAGATION IN NCL PIPELINE
Because of the hysteresis of threshold gates, the delay faults will be filtered by NCL pipeline, and therefore only the transient/steady faults, caused by variations of the power supply voltage, temperature, radiation, intense light or EM disturbances,particle strikes, and so forth, will have influence on the behavior of NCL pipelines.
The propagation of a transient reset fault (1-0-1) or steady reset fault (1-0) in NCL pipelines, may lead to an earlier completion of the current computation without affecting the circuit logic function. In contrast, the propagation of a transient set fault (0-1-0) or steady set fault (0-1) may make the errorfree signal high and result in a wrong DATA, which may be: delivered to the next stage. Table I shows the behavior profile for the NCL pipeline.If a transient/steady set fault appears on the output rails Dout0 (Dout00, Dout10) before the signal Ki1 is set to high, the fault will not be delivered to the next stage, and thus the next stage cannot receive any new data at this time. In contrast, if a transient/steady set fault appears on the output rails Dout0 (Dout00 , Dout10 ) after the signal Ki1 is set to high, the fault will be delivered to the next stage. However, the influence of NCL pipelines will be different, depending on the fault propagation characteristics. For simplicity, it is assumed that a transient/steady set fault appears on the output railDout 0 1 whose error free signal is low and the signal K i 1 is set to high. As shown in Figs. 2 and 3 , respectively, once the fault arrives at the register in the current stage, prior to the correct DATA on the output rail Dout 0 0 . The wrong DATA (0, 1) will be delivered to the next stage prior to the illegal dual-rail code (1, 1). The same situation happens when a transient/steady set fault appears on the output rail Dout 1 0 whose error-free signal is low. More formally, the preconditions that the wrong DATA will take to propagate through the pipeline can be defined as follows
where t T and t D are the duration of the transient/steady set fault and the correct DATA, respectively, and Delay T and Delay D are the propagation delay of the transient/steady set fault and the correct DATA, respectively, before they arrive at the register in the next stage.
However, a special case that the transient/steady set fault and the correct DATA arrive at the register in the next stage at the same time, should be noted. In this case, the illegal dual -rail code (1, 1) will be exhibited on the rails Din 1 (Din More formally, for the transient set fault, the precondition that the illegal dual-rail code (1, 1) will be exhibited immediately in the next stage, can be defined as follows:
For the steady set fault, because of the hold characteristics of the fault signal, the condition that the illegal dual-rail code will be exhibited immediately in the current stage, can be defined as follows:
If the transient/steady set fault occurs on the rail whose error-free signal is high, it will only lead to an earlier transition from NULL to DATA without affecting the circuit logic function.
IV. FAULT-ATTACK RESISTANT ARCHITECTURES
As a result of the logical determination of NCL circuits, wavefronts will propagate without any requirements of signif-icant timing assumptions. It may make each dual-rail data flow out from the output of the computational block at different times. Furthermore, even if the input DATA is synchronized, there will still be differences of the propagation delay for each data paths.
An 4 bit Sbox architecture is shown in the following fig.5 . It is not sure that 4 of the inputs of Sbox arrives at the same time. Which may cause some hazard at the output. The output signals comes at intervals in nanoseconds. 
A. SBox
The Sub Bytes operation is a nonlinear byte substitution. Each byte from the input state is replaced by another byte according to the substitution box (called the S-box). The S-box is computed based on a multiplicative inverse in the finite field GF (28) and a bitwise affine transformation.
In this module The implementation of the composite field S-BOX is accomplished using combinational logic circuits rather than using prestored S-BOX values. S-BOX substitution starts by finding the multiplicative inverse of the number.
As DI register propagates the error or illegal dual rail code from input to output. To overcome this drawback, we use a spacial type of register called SFRT .
B. SFRT Register
To improve the resistant against the fault attack, the SSFRT structure is presented in this paper. Its basic idea can be described as follows.
1) Restrict the dual-rail data by synchronizing the input data and delaying the propagation control signal to transform faults into illegal dual-rail ISSN: 2348 -8549 www.internationaljournalssrg.org Page 5 codes. Specifically, by reducing the time interval of the dual-rail data and matching the propagation delay between the fault and the correct DATA, the preconditions (1) and (2) are not satisfied. 2) On the basis of the aforementioned idea, implement a multilevel faults/illegal code monitor and immediately start the local flushing once the fault/illegal code is detected.
If the computational block is composed of an 4-Bit SBox (Subbyte) as shown in Fig. 5 , then the implementation of SSFRT can be shown in Fig. 6 . Only when all the DATA wavefronts have arrived at the input synchronization block, the control signal SYN input , produced by the TH 44 gate, could be set to high to allow the DATA wavefronts to flow into the computational block. Simultaneously, the control signal SYN input will take to propagate through the delay block. As a result, the signal SYN t r will be set to high. Finally, the signal SYN O will be set to high, to allow the DATA wavefront to be received by the SRFT register. It is important to note that the delay block will result in the worst case propagation delay of the computational block, and a configurable delay module can be connected in series. As a result, the output data have already appeared on the output port of the computa-tional block, before the signal SYN tr transforms from low to high. The illegal code monitor is used to detect the illegal dual-rail code (1, 1) on the rails. For example, if the illegal dual-rail code is exhibited on the rails (O 0 0 , O 0 1 ), the output of the TH22 gate will be set to high, and then the output of the TH12 gate will be also set to high. Finally, the signal SYN illegal will be set to low through the inverter. Now, let us assume that the transient or steady set fault is generated on, where the error-free signal is low in the computational block prior to the correct DATA. As the fault is not allowed to flow into the SFRT register until the signal SYN O is high, and the signal SYN tr is not set to high until all of the DATA wavefronts have arrived at the input port of SFRT register, the illegal dual-rail code (1, 1) will be exhibited before the fault is delivered to the SFRT register, and the signal SYN illegal of the illegal code monitor M 1 will be set to high prior to the signal SYN tr under the influence of the delay block. As a result, the signal SYN O will still be low, and any data which is generated by the current computational block, will be prevented from flowing into the SFRT register. Moreover, the local reset signal Reset i will be set to high, to allow the NULL wavefront to overwrite the computational block. Finally, the input DATA will come to the computational block again for recomputation. It is the same when the faults in SFRT register is detected, and the output signal alarm is set to high.
Assume that a wrong DATA is delivered to the SFRT register (note that this is the worst case assumption), it will be detected by the illegal dual-rail code monitor. Moreover, the internal faults caused by the soft-error can be easily detected using the built-in fault monitor M 2 . Once an illegal code/internal fault is detected, the signal alarm will be set to high, and finally the local reset signal Reset i (in Fig. 6 ) will be also set to high. This will result in the local reset action, and then the NULL wavefronts will overwrite the computational block. Once the NULL wavefronts flow into the SFRT register, the signal Clear will be set to high, which will force the register to flush. There are three PRS Blocks are placed inside the SFRT register. It checks for illegal dual rail code and if the illegal code is present, then it raises the alarm and flush the input.
C. Analysis of the Resistance to the Fault Propagation
Because the analysis of the transient set faults is similar to the steady set faults, for simplicity, it is assumed that only the steady set faults should be considered.
1) Wrong DATA Takes to Propagate Prior to the Correct DATAit is assumed that a steady set fault is generated on the rail O 0 0 (in Fig. 6 ) during the cycle 1. Furthermore, the wrong DATA (1, 0) takes to propagate prior to the correct DATA (0, 1) on the rails (O 0 0 , O 0 1 ). The processing flow of the SSFRT structure is described as follows.
Step 1: Under the influence of the correct DATA on the rail O 0 1 and the delay between the signal SYN input and SYN tr , the steady set fault on the ISSN: 2348 -8549 www.internationaljournalssrg.org Page 6 rail O 0 0 will be transformed into the illegal dualrail code (1, 1) before being delivered to the SFRT register, then the illegal dual-rail code will be captured by the illegal code monitor M1, and the signal SYN illegal will be set to low. Steps 2-4: When the signal SYN illegal is set to low, the signal SYN O will be forced to low, and the steady set fault cannot be delivered to the SFRT register. At the same time, the local reset signal Reseti will be set to high to allow the NULL wavefronts to overwrite the computational block. It should be noticed that the local reset action has no influence on the current state of NCL pipeline, and thus it will not result in the deadlock or the reset of the NCL pipeline. So, with the behaviors of the dual-rail encoded systems as described, the SFRT register can resist the fault attacks Step 5: When the NULL wavefronts arrive at the output of the computational blocks, the signal SYN illegal will be set to high, and then the signal Reset i will be set to low Steps 6 and 7: The input DATA flows into the computationalblock for the recomputation. Simultaneously, the signal SYN input is set to high again and propagates through the delay block. Consequently, the signal SYN tr will be set to high. It is assumed that the propagation delay caused by the delay block is t spread , and the delay between the rising edge of the signal SYN input and SYN tr is defined as t delay1 . Then as the signal SYN illegal is set to high prior to the signal SYN tr in the Step 1, the relationship that t delay1 > 2 ×t spread can be satisfied. Steps 8 and 9: Because the signal SYN illegal , SYN tr , andSYN feed are all high, the signal SYN O will be also set to high, and the current DATA wavefornts will be delivered to the SFRT register.
Step 10: After the DATA wavefronts are delivered to theSFRT register, the signal SYN O will be set to low by the signal SYN feed to stop the subsequent data input.
2) Wrong DATA and the Correct DATA Propagate at the Same Time: Similarly to 1), if both the wrong DATAand the correct DATA propagate at the same time, the signal SYN illegal will be set to low prior to the signal SYN O under the influence of the transition delay between the signal SYN input and SYN tr . As a result, the wrong DATA cannot be delivered to the SFRT register, and then, the NULL wavefronts will overwrite the computational block.
3) Correct DATA Propagates Prior to the Wrong DATA:Let us assume that a steady set fault is injected, and the wrong DATA (1, 0) will not be generated on the rails (O m 0 , O m 1 ) until the correct dual-rail DATA (0, 1) takes to propagate. Then the resistance to the fault propagation will be different depending on the duration of the steady set fault.
C. Comparison With Previous Designs
In previous designs the sbox architecture is prone to fault attacks and internal errors that occurs in SBo and register. Drawbacks of previous design are as follows : i)Illegal dual rail codes are fet as inputs of the SBox circuit.
ii)Output is generated befere all input lines are available. And after all input lines comes online, then the output changes. Which leads to hazard.
iii)If any internal error occcurs then it propagated to the output which causes SEU.
iv)It is vulnerable to fault attack and other cypher attacks. The proposed system with SFRT architecture has the following advantages over previous systems.
i)The input is fed to the computational block after data arrives at all input lines. Input synchronization block is used for this purpose.
ii)If the illegal dual rail code is found at the input lines then it is blocked at the early stage and not fed to the computation block.
iii)Illegal dual rail code at the output of computation block is filtered by M1 (Illegal dual rail code monitor) and resets the input.
iv)The SFRT register has output synchronization, self feedback and illegal code monitor at three stages as shown in Fig.7. v)It regulates the output rails and makes all output signals arrives at same time. V. SIMULATION RESULTS To estimate the fault resistance of the SSFRT structure, in our experiment, circuit is designed in and simulated by Modelsim 6.3 Simulator. The steady set faults in the SFRT register will result in the illegal dual-rail code, which will be detected by the illegal DATA (1, 0) is delivered to the SFRT register, the wrong DATA (0, 1) will occur in the register prior to the correct DATA. At this time, because the results of the computational block have not been delivered to the SFRT register, the signal Clear of the register will ISSN: 2348 -8549 www.internationaljournalssrg.org Page 7 be high. Consequently, the wrong DATA cannot take to propagate in the SFRT register. In the same way, all the transient set faults, that occur prior to the input of the correct DATA, cannot take to propagate in the SFRT register It is important to note that the wrong DATA will be sup-pressed by the handshaking mechanism between stages in most cases, because of the wavefront's monotonically transition between the disjoint domains in NCL circuits. Furthermore, even if the wrong DATA takes to propagatein the twolevel and three-cycle ring structure, it will result in the deadlock or the occurrence of two DATA wavefronts in two stages in the same level, and the signal alarm will be set to high, to allow the NULL wavefront to overwrite the SFRT register. So, the faults injection can still be detected by the built-in fault monitor M 2 in the worst case scenario.
As shown in the output of the proposed method Fig.8 , for the first two cycles, the output is generated for correct data. All data arrives at the output line at same time. We cannot see any hazard or wave fluctuations. we induce illegal code at the input, in this case the output is not generated and it triggers the reset.
We induce the illegal code at internal pins (also inside the register), which represent the fault attack or internal soft errror, it is blocked and triggers reset. The illegal code monitors available at different stages has raised the alarm for error signals and internal errors and blocks the faulty data to be available at output. Then it flush and reset the signals and wait for next cycle. If the correct data arrived, then the couput is generated. It is shown in Fig.8 .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we mainly focus on the architecturelevel improvements on the resistance against fault attacks. We have investigated the propagation characteristics of faults in NCL pipelines, and proposed the SSFRT structure based on the robustness of NCL pipelines and dual-rail encoded systems.
The following fault scenarios can be mitigated by the SFFRT structure.
1) The fault takes to propagate prior to the correct DATA on the output rails of the computational block.
2) The correct DATA takes to propagate prior to the fault on the output rails of the computational block.
3) The fault and the correct DATA take to propagate simultaneously on the output rails of the computational block. 4) The fault is induced in the SFRT register before the correct DATA has been delivered to the SFRT register.
5) The SEU is induced in the SFRT register after the correct DATA has been delivered to the SFRT register, but the SEU and the correct DATA do not reside in the same subregister at the same time. Another contribution of this paper lies in a register design that offers an efficient resistance against the SEU. A more efficient resistance against the fault injection can be achieved. The encryption operation takes place in the computational block. If the data is corrupted inside the circiut, then the architecture design blocks the data and prevent it from being available at the output. Faulty data are filtered and blocked inside the circuit and reset the input. Only correct data will be allowed available at the output.
